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1 Introduction
The recent financial turmoil, which started with the meltdown of the U.S. subprime
mortgage market, spread rapidly around the world and affected the world’s economic
system through a series of cross-country contagion mechanisms. As a consequence, GDP
dropped around the world and global malfunctioning occurred in financial markets. Figure
1 illustrates these recent global downturns in the United States, Canada, Japan and
the United Kingdom. The high degree of interdependence between the real economy
and the financial markets in several countries simultaneously suggests a strong degree of
international transmission of domestic and external shocks. This high interconnectedness
between economic and financial markets may be viewed as a consequence of financial
markets integration, globalization of trade, and the higher volume of cross-border assets
held by economic agents.
Recent empirical and theoretical evidence has highlighted the importance of credit
market imperfections in the transmission of shocks (Bernanke et al. (1999), Christiano
et al. (2010), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011), Meh and Moran (2010), and Dib (2010)).
In these papers, credit market imperfections can be of two types: (i) corporate balance
sheet (financial accelerator) channel models, which focus on the demand side of the credit
market and (ii) bank balance sheet channel models, which focus on the supply side of the
credit market. Together, they suggest that the financial health of banks and firms may
significantly alter the transmission of monetary policy and others shocks.
This evidence underscores the need to develop a general equilibrium model with real-
financial linkages in an international framework. Indeed, understanding and quantifying
these real-financial linkages is an important step towards the identification of the best
policy response to international developments. For example, understanding these link-
ages would allow Canadian authorities to examine whether international trade in goods
and financial markets can explain the observed spillover effects of U.S. business cycles on
the Canadian economy. In addition, a better knowledge of these linkages will allow cen-
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tral banks to assess the contribution of internal and external sources to the fluctuations
observed in various OECD countries.
While the international transmission mechanism and the bank capital channel have
both generated a large body of research with well-established contributions, the analy-
sis of these two issues simultaneously has received less attention. This paper aims to
bridge this gap by proposing a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) for a
small open economy with an active bank balance sheet channel to analyze the relative
contribution of the bank balance sheets channel, the exchange rate channel, and the finan-
cial accelerator channel in the propagation of internal and external shocks. Specifically,
this paper contributes to the growing literature aimed at understanding how countries
react to an adverse foreign shock by assessing two major issues: first, how important is
the banks’ balance sheet channel relative to both the interest rate (financial accelerator)
and exchange rate channels and as second, how does the bank capital channel affect the
international transmission mechanism.
Although the fact that credit conditions can affect the real economy is widely docu-
mented, incorporating credit market frictions in quantitative general equilibrium models
started relatively recently, with the seminal contributions of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997),
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Bernanke et al. (1999). These models highlight the link
between the cost of borrowing and the net worth of the borrower, a link now widely
referred to as the financial accelerator mechanism. This so-called financial accelerator
mechanism focuses on financial frictions caused by asymmetric information between en-
trepreneurs and banks (on the demand side), but is silent about the effects of financial
frictions on the supply side. However, evidence suggests that the capitalization of the
banking system can also affect the lending capacity of the financial sector. Quantitative
modeling of this effect has been undertaken in Markovic (2006), Goodfriend and McCal-
lum (2007), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011), Meh and Moran (2010) and Dib (2010). These
papers provided complementary contributions to the one by Bernanke et al. (1999) by
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showing that frictions on the supply side of credit also affect the propagation of shocks.
In this context, the starting point of our model is the framework developed by Meh and
Moran (2010), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) and Dib (2010), to which we add cross-border
goods distribution, the exchange rate channel,1 a government and a capital accumulation
process in the spirit of Christiano et al. (2005) and Christiano et al. (2010). In the model,
banks intermediate funds between households and borrowing entrepreneurs and are re-
sponsible to monitor entrepreneurs’ actions. Entrepreneurs have an incentive to choose
projects with lower expected returns, because these allow them to consume private bene-
fits. Banks can detect (imperfectly) the type of projects chosen using a costly monitoring
technology. To discourage entrepreneurs from going after projects with private benefits,
entrepreneurs are required to invest their own funds in the projects. Bankers may not,
however dutifully monitor the entrepreneurs, in order to save the costs of monitoring.
Consequently, households only lend to well-capitalized banks who have a lot to lose in
case of loan default. As a result, the bank’s capital position and the entrepreneurial net
worth jointly constitute the lending constraint of banks and the borrowing constraint of
entrepreneurs, and determine aggregate investment.
We conduct several quantitative experiments with the model, both in closed and open
economy. The results of our simulations may be summarized as follow: (i) In the presence
of the exchange rate channel, the propagation of domestic and foreign shocks is amplified
when comparing our baseline economy to a closed economy. (ii) Depending of the level
of bank capital in the economy, productivity and monetary policy shocks that originate
domestically have an important quantitative role in explaining domestic output, invest-
ment, bank lending, entrepreneur and bank net worth, inflation and interest rates. (iii)
External shocks (monetary policy and foreign demand shocks) also contribute to domestic
aggregate fluctuations. (iv) Economies whose banks remain well-capitalized when affected
by adverse shock experience less severe downturns, i.e., when the bank capital channel is
1The exchange rate channel operates through the relative prices and the elasticity of substitution
between domestic and imported consumption goods.
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active, an economy with more bank capital is better able to face adverse shocks than an
economy with less bank capital. This last result, which remains valid for the transmis-
sion of international shocks, highlights the importance of bank capital in an international
framework and can be used to inform the worldwide debate over banking regulation.
This paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, we provide a contribution
to the literature on financial frictions in open economies by examining the role of bank
capital in international business cycle fluctuations. Second, our paper complements the
existing literature on the international transmission of business cycles by analyzing the
relative contribution of three transmission channels. This literature includes Teng-Xu
(2012) and Kamber and Thonissen (2012), in which the incorporation of credit provides
significant improvement in modeling and forecasting output growth, changes in inflation
and long run interest rates, for countries with developed banking sector; as well as, Kehoe
and Perri (2002), Iacoviello and Minetti (2006), Smets and Wouters (2007), Devereux and
Yetman (2010) and Guerrieri et al. (2012) whose framework explain some of the features
of the international transmission of business cycles that cannot be explained by RBC
models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
the financial contract between households, banks and entrepreneurs. In Section 3, we
discuss aggregation and present the definition of the competitive equilibrium. Section
1 presents the calibration and describes the economy’s steady state. In Section 5, we
discuss our findings and conduct a set of experiments related to the bank capital channel,
the international transmission of domestic shocks and the transmission of international
shocks. Section 5 concludes.
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Figure 1: Global economic downturns (Output and Financial index)
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Note: This figure illustrates the recent global downturns in the U.S., Canada, UK and Japan. The left
chart displays the dynamic of GDP growth, whereas the right chart presents the evolution of the main
financial indexes in the aforementioned countries. Data are from Bloomberg, canadian socioeconomic
database (Cansim) and International financial statistics.
2 The General Macroeconomic Environment
The economy is composed of a continuum of households of mass ηh, entrepreneurs of
mass ηe, bankers (financial intermediaries) of mass ηb, with ηh + ηb + ηe = 1. In addition,
there are firms (domestic and foreign), a domestic government and monetary authorities,
both domestic and foreign. Households-workers supply differentiated labor and rent their
accumulated physical capital. Their revenues include money received from the domestic
monetary authority as lump-sum transfers, returns on physical capital, deposits, bonds
holding and labour supply − while their expenses include bond purchases, consumption
and taxes. Households divide their high-powered money into bonds, bank deposits and
currency, which pays no interest and is held for the transactions services its provides.2
Entrepreneurs use their own resources and bank loans to finance projects of size It
2In this paper, we adopt a real money-in-the-utility-function approach to introducing currency, but a
cash-in-advance version of the model yields qualitatively similar results.
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that produce a new capital. An asymmetric information problem, discussed in detail
below, exists between the borrowing entrepreneurs and the lending bank and is a key
feature of the credit channel. The model also includes an intermediate goods production
sector, located in the domestic country.3 These firms operate under monopolistic com-
petition and use labor and capital to produce the domestic intermediate goods. Next,
perfectly competitive firms produce domestic and foreign composite goods, both at home
and abroad. Part of the domestic composite goods produced is exported, and what re-
mains locally is combined to foreign composite goods to produce the final goods, using
a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) production function. Finally, the final good is
allocated to consumption and investment.
The model discussion is organized into five subsections. The first subsection de-
scribes the informational environment and the financial contract between entrepreneurs
and bankers. Subsection 2.2 presents the preferences of households and Subsection 2.3 de-
scribes production of the final good and its distribution. The fourth Subsection highlights
the structure of production for intermediate good. Finally, the fifth Subsection describes
government and monetary authorities. Diagram [2] (in Appendix 1) summarizes the gen-
eral structure of the model.
2.1 The Optimal Financial Contract
Our financial contract model is built following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Chen (2001)
and Meh and Moran (2010). Each contract results from the interaction between house-
holds, entrepreneurs and bankers. Entrepreneurs have access to a stochastic investment
technology that transforms It units of final goods into ω˜It (ω˜ = R or 0) units of capital
goods, with ω˜ = R representing success and ω˜ = 0 representing failure of the project.
3Including this sector provides a channel to capture the transmission of technology shocks to the
economy. It is worth mentioning that we do not permit an international mobility of labor between
countries in this framework.
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A project size of It will be financed by funds from the entrepreneur and the banker.
Bankers finance their contribution with household deposits as well as their own equity
(bank capital).
Entrepreneurs have access to different types of projects each producing the same return
Rt in units of capital when the project succeeds and zero when it fails. The returns
from entrepreneurial projects are publicly observable but the exante success probability
of the projects depends on an unobservable action taken by the entrepreneurs. If an
action ah is undertaken, the probability of success is αh and if an action al is undertaken,
the probability of success is αl (with αh > αl). The success of the project differs in
the action undertaken by the entrepreneurs and therefore in the probability of success.
Entrepreneurs will enjoy a private benefit b from choosing an action al and zero from
choosing the action ah. This behaviour introduces a moral hazard problem. Henceforth,
without a proper incentive, entrepreneurs may deliberately choose an action al with low
probability of success and high private benefit. Under this moral hazard problem and,
in the way to reduce the entrepreneurs’ incentives to choose an action al, bankers’ have
access to an imperfect monitoring technology, which can enforce entrepreneurs to choose
a socially preferable action ah. Therefore, if banker occurs a private monitoring cost µ,
this will reduce the private benefit to entrepreneur from b to 0.
When successful, the project unit return, R, is shared among the entrepreneur (Ret ),
the banker (Rbt) and the households (Rht ). All agents receive nothing when the project
fails. The optimal financial contract will allow us to determine the optimal project size
It conditional on entrepreneurial net worth, deposits and bank capital.
Assumption [1]: Households are assumed to be neither able to monitor the activity
of entrepreneurs nor of enforcing the financial contracts with entrepreneurs. Therefore,
there is no feasible financial contract between entrepreneurs and households. We assume
that there exists a feasible financial contract between entrepreneurs and bankers, where
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banks have an inventive to participate in the financial contract:
αhQtR
b
tIt ≥ (1 + rat )At, (2.1)
whereAt and rat are the bank net worth and the rates of return on bank equity, respectively.
Assumption [2]: We assume that excluding the private benefit, the high probability
action ah is socially preferable and optimal.
αhQtR
h
t It ≥ (1 + rdt )Dt. (2.2)
This incentive constraint shows that the funds engaged by the investing households earn
an expected return (αhQtRht It with Qt the price of capital) sufficient to cover the market-
determined required returns on deposits rdt .
Assumption [3]: An incentive compatibility condition requires that the expected
return of the banker from the socially optimal action (ah), net of monitoring cost incurred,
should be greater than or equal to the expected return of net monitoring, which would
ensure entrepreneurs engage in the non-socially optimal action (al):
αhQtR
b
tIt − µQtIt ≥ αlQtRbtIt. (2.3)
This condition ensures that the bank has an incentive to monitor the entrepreneurial
projects.
Assumption [4]: We also impose that the entrepreneur has an inventive to choose a
socially optimal action when bankers monitor, i.e :
αhQtR
e
tIt ≥ αlRetQtIt + bQtIt. (2.4)
This latest condition ensures that the expected return of entrepreneurs if they choose the
socially optimal action with high probability of success is at least as high as the one they
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would get if the undertook a non socially optimal project with low probability of success
but receives the private benefits bQtIt.
Definition 1 (Optimal financial contract): The optimal financial contract consists
of the maximization of the entrepreneur’s expected return, given the incentive compatibility
and capital requirement constraints (2.1), (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4). With Ret +Rbt +Rht ≤ R
(sharing condition), this maximization program can be written as
V e(At, Dt) = max
It,Rht ,R
b
t ,R
e
t
αhQtR
e
tIt (2.5)
s.t.:
αlQtR
e
tIt + bQtIt ≤ αhQtRetIt
αlQtR
b
tIt ≤ αhQtRbtIt − µQtIt
(1 + rat )At ≤ αhQtRbtIt
(1 + rdt )Dt ≤ αhQtRht It
Lst ≤ At +Dt − µIt
Ldt ≤ It −Nt
Proposition 1 (Optimal financial contract): Solving the entrepreneur’s max-
imization program yields: Ret =
b
αg−αl =
b
∆α
; Rbt =
µ
Qt∆α
; Rht = R − b∆α − µQt∆α .
The amount of bank capital and household deposits, and investment level in equilib-
rium are given given by At = αhµIt/(1 + rat )∆α, Dt =
αhQt
(1+rdt )
(
Rt − b∆α − µQt∆α
)
It and
It = (Nt + At)/
(
1 + µ− αhQt
1+rdt
(
Rt − b∆α − µQt∆α
))
= (Nt + At)/Levt, where Levt is the
bank’s total leverage.
Proof: see appendix (7.3).
The upshot of the financial contract shows that the shares of project return allocated
to the entrepreneur (Ret ) and the banker (Rbt) are linked to the severity of the moral
hazard problem associated with their decision, as captured by the monitoring cost µ and
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the private benefit b. As a result, the share of project return promised to households is
decreasing as the severity of the moral hazard increases in the economy.4
2.2 Households
The model is composed of a continuum of infinitely-lived households of mass ηh indexed
by i ∈ (0, ηh). We assume that households in the domestic country are covered by
perfect insurance contracts, which allows us to analyze the behaviour of a representative
household. A representative agent maximizes a utility function that depends positively
on consumption and negatively on work effort. In addition, households derive utility from
holding currency, supply a differentiated labor input (used by domestic firms), and set
nominal wage using Calvo’s partial indexation mechanism. Lifetime utility is :
Uh0 ≡ E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtU
(
Cht − γCht−1,
Mt
Pt
, Lt
)}
, (2.6)
where the consumption basket and the labour supply at period t are represented by
Cht and Lt, Pt is the domestic price level and Mt/Pt denotes real money balances at the
end of period t. The period utility function U(.) is separable in consumption, real money
balances, and hours worked and has a constant-relative-risk aversion (CRRA) form. In
equation (2.6), β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the household’s discount factor whereas γ ∈ (0, 1)
is the parameter that controls the extent of habit. Finally, E0 denotes the conditional
expectation operator evaluated at time 0 and the single-period utility function is specified
as:
U(·) = log (Cht − γCht−1)+ ψlog (1− Lt) + ζlog(MtPt
)
. (2.7)
Households own all domestic firms. Accordingly, they receive dividend payments and
also earn income from their holdings of domestic and foreign bonds Bdt and B
f
t . Domestic
bonds yields a nominal return rbt and foreign bonds produces r
f
t as a nominal return.
4see Meh and Moran (2010) for more details concerning the optimal financial contract
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Households also pay taxes on their wage with the taxe rate given by τw. Finally, households
face a capital utilization rate decision: at the beginning of each period, they can offer
capital services utKht , where ut is the utilization rate, such that rental income from capital
will be rkt utKht and the convex utilization cost will be υ(ut).5 Incorporating all revenues
and expenses, the typical household’s budget constraint is given by
(1 + rdt )Dt−1 + (1 + r
b
t )
Bdt−1
pit
+ stκt(etb
f
t , ε
e
t )(1 + r
f
t )
Bft−1
pi∗t
+ (1− τw)W
h
t
Pt
Lt + (r
k
t ut − υ(ut))Kht +
Mt−1
Pt
+ Πt +Xt
= Cht +QtI
h
t +Dt +
Mt
Pt
+Bdt + stB
f
t .
(2.8)
In equation (2.8), Dt is the real bank deposits and rdt is the nominal interest rate.
pit and pi∗t are, respectively, the domestic and the foreign inflation rates. The real ex-
change rate is defined as st = etP ∗t /Pt, where et represents the nominal exchange rate
expressed in terms of the domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. In the second
line, (1 − τw)W
h
t
Pt
Lt denotes net labor earnings received by the household. Furthermore,
the household receives a lump-sum transfer from the monetary authority, Xt, as well as
dividend payments, Πt, from retailer firms. Finally, P ∗t is the aggregate foreign price level
and Qt is price of the capital associated to the investment level It.
The function κ(.) represents the premium associated with buying foreign bonds and it
captures the costs (or benefits) for households of holding positions in international asset
markets. In the case that the amount of debt issued by a foreign country is greater than
its steady state value, then households are charged a premium on the foreign interest
rate. As in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), we assume that this function depends on
per capita holdings of foreign bonds with respect to nominal output of the composite
domestic goods, and a specific functional form of log(κt) = $εet
[
exp
(
stB
f
t
Yt
)
− 1
]
, where
5This follows Christiano et al. (2005).
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$ is a parameter that captures the risk premium of foreign bonds.6 Finally, the law of
motion of capital accumulation is expressed as Iht = Kht − (1− δ)Kht−1.
Given the preferences of a representative household and its budget constraint, the
Lagrangian function associated is
L0(.) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt

log
(
Cht − γCht−1
)
+ ψlog (1− Lt) + ζlog
(
Mt
Pt
)
− Λt
{
Cht +QtI
h
t +Dt +
Mt
Pt
+Bdt + stB
f
t
− (1 + rbt )
Bdt−1
pit
− stκt(etbft , εet )(1 + rft )
Bft−1
pi∗t
−(1 + rdt )Dt−1 − (1− τw)
W ht
Pt
Lt − Mt−1
Pt
− Πt
−(rkt ut − υ(ut))Kht −Xt
}

(2.9)
where Λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint.
The household’s optimization problem consists of choosing
{
Cht ,Mt, B
d
t , B
f
t , Dt, K
h
t
}
for all t ∈ [0,∞) to maximize lifetime utility function given a budget constraint.
The household’s first-order conditions (except for labor and wages, described below)
are given by:
1
Cht − γCht−1
− βγEt
[
1
Cht+1 − γCht
]
= Λt; (2.10)
ζ
Mt/Pt
+ βEt
[
Λt+1
pit+1
]
= Λt; (2.11)
βEt
[
Λt+1(1 + r
b
t+1)
pit+1
]
= Λt; (2.12)
βEt
[
Λt+1(1 + r
f
t+1)
pi∗t+1
κt+1
st+1
st
]
= Λt; (2.13)
6Computationally, a premium on the foreign interest rate is introduced to help the system have a
well-defined steady state.
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βEt
[
Λt+1Qt+1
Λt
(
1− δ + rkt+1ut+1 − v(ut+1) + φ
(
Kht+1
Kht
− 1
)
Kht+1
Kht
)]
= Qt
(
1 + φ
(
Kht
Kht−1
− 1
))
;
(2.14)
βEt
[
Λt+1(1 + r
d
t+1)
]
= Λt; (2.15)
rt = v
′(ut). (2.16)
The decision related to labour effort and wage setting is absent from (2.10)−(2.16)
and we now describe it. Following the New Keynesian paradigm models (Christiano et al.
(2005), Smets and Wouters (2007) and Christiano et al. (2010)), each household supplies
a differentiated labour type used by intermediate good producers. The household has
monopoly power over its own-type wage and sets that wage using Calvo’s partial index-
ation mechanism. This decision takes into account the production structure described
below.
An aggregate composite labour input is supplied by competitive firms that hire the
labor supplied by each household and aggregates the different types into one composite, us-
ing a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) function given by: Lt =
(∫ ηh
0
L
ξw−1
ξw
it di
) ξw
ξw−1
,
where 0 ≤ ξw ≤ +∞ is the elasticity of substitution between different types. These firms
maximize profits subject to the production function and given all differentiated labor
wages, Wt(i), and the aggregate wage, Wt. Their maximization problem is therefore as
follows:
max
{Lit}
{
Wt
Pt
Lt −
∫ ηh
0
Wit
Pt
Litdi
}
, subject to Lt =
(∫ ηh
0
L
ξw−1
ξw
it di
) ξw
ξw−1
. (2.17)
The first order condition leads to Lit =
(
Wit
Wt
)−ξw
Lt, which represents the economy-
wide demand for the labour type i. Further, the zero profit condition implied by perfect
competition can be used to show that Wt =
(∫ ηh
0
W 1−ξwit di
) 1
1−ξw .
Following Calvo (1983), households’ wage setting uses the following structure. In each
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period, a fraction 1− φw of households are free to reoptimize their wage. The remaining
households can only index their wage to the previous periods rate of overall price inflation,
with the degree of indexation captured by χw ∈ (0, 1). This nominal rigidity implies that
for a household who has not reoptimized for k periods, its effective wage is given by
k∏
s=1
piχwt+s−1
pit+s
Wit
Pt
.
The part of the Lagrangian function in (2.9) used to set optimal hours worked Lit and
wage Wit, is given by
max
W˜it
Et
∞∑
k=0
φkwβ
k
{
ψlog(1− Lt+k) + Λt+k
k∏
l=1
piχwt+l−1
pit+l
(1− τw)Wit
Pt
Li,t+k
}
, (2.18)
subject to the following constraint: Li,t+k =
(∏k
l=1
piχwt+l−1
pit+l
Wit
Wt+k
)−ξw
Lt+k, which repre-
sents the demand faced by type i labour in the event the wage has not been reoptimized
in period t+ k. The first-order condition with respect to Wit leads to:
W˜t =
ξw
ξw − 1
Et
∞∑
k=0
(βφw)
k ψ
1− Lt+kLt+k
(
k∏
l=1
piχwt+l−1
pit+l
)1−ξw
W ξwt+k
Et
∞∑
k=0
(βφw)
kΛt+k(1− τw)Lt+k
(
k∏
l=1
piχwt+l−1
pit+l
)−ξw
W ξwt+k
. (2.19)
2.3 Distribution and Good Production
The distribution sector is composed of intermediate and final good producers. Interme-
diate good producers include domestic and foreign firms, each producing a differentiated
product and operating under monopolistic competition. Output produced by the interme-
diate good producers is then converted into a composite domestic good and a composite
foreign good by competitive firms. Finally, domestic and foreign composite goods are
combined to produce final output, which is allocated to consumption and investment.
This structure of good distribution, standard in the open-economy DSGE models litera-
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ture (Ambler et al. (2004), Iacoviello and Minetti (2006) and Faia (2007) among others)
is illustrated in Appendix (3).
2.3.1 Final Good Production
Progressing from aggregates to specifics, the final step of the distribution chain is the pro-
duction of the final good, Zt, which is produced by domestic firms using a CES technology.
The representative firm combines the domestic composite good (Y dt ) with an imported
composite good (Y ft ) as
Zt =
(
ωd
1
λz (Y dt )
λz−1
λz + (1− ωd)
1
λz (Y ft )
λz−1
λz
) λz
λz−1
, (2.20)
where 0 < ωd < 1 denotes the share of domestic goods in the final good production
process (ωd can also interpreted as the steady state degree of openness). The elasticity
of substitution between domestic composite good and imported good is then captured by
λz.
The typical final good producer maximizes profits subject to the production function
in (2.20) taking as given the price of the domestic composite good (P dt ), the price of the
imported composite good (P ft ) and the price of the final good (Pt). The maximization
program is
max
Y dt ,Y
f
t
{
PtZt − P dt Y dt − P ft Y ft
}
, subject to Zt =
(
ωd
1
λz (Y dt )
λz−1
λz + (1− ωd)
1
λz (Y ft )
λz−1
λz
) λz
λz−1
.
(2.21)
and the associated first-order conditions provide economy-wide demand schedules for the
domestic composite good and the imported good:
Y dt = ωd
(
P dt
Pt
)−λz
Zt, (2.22)
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Y ft = (1− ωd)
(
P ft
Pt
)−λz
Zt. (2.23)
In addition the zero-profit condition yields the following determination of the price of the
final goods Pt:
Pt =
[
ωd(P
d
t )
1−λz + (1− ωd)(P ft )1−λz
] 1
1−λz
. (2.24)
2.3.2 Domestic Composite Good Production
The domestic composite good, Y dt , is produced by a continuum of competitive domestic
firms using domestic intermediate goods as inputs. These producers aggregate domestic
intermediate goods using the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator
Y dt =
(∫ 1
0
Y dt (j)
ξd−1
ξd dj
) ξd
ξd−1
, (2.25)
where ξd denotes the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods and Y dt (j) denotes
the quantity used of each variety. The maximization program of these producers is given
by
max
Y dt (j)
{
P dt Y
d
t −
∫ 1
0
P dt (j)Y
d
t (j)dj
}
s.t. Y dt =
(∫ 1
0
Y dt (j)
ξd−1
ξd dj
) ξd
ξd−1
(2.26)
The input demand for each intermediate good of type j and the price of the domestic
composite good are respectively given by
Y dt (j) = Y
d
t
(
P dt (j)
P dt
)−ξd,t
, (2.27)
P dt =
(∫ 1
0
P dt (j)
1−ξd,tdj
) 1
1−ξd,t
. (2.28)
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2.3.3 Foreign Composite Good Production
The foreign composite good, Y ft , is also assembled by a continuum of competitive firms
using domestic intermediate goods, Y ft (j), as inputs. Similarly to the domestic composite
good, the foreign composite good producer aggregates foreign intermediate goods using
the Dixit-Stiglitz form
Y ft =
(∫ 1
0
Y ft (j)
ξf−1
ξf dj
) ξf
ξf−1
, (2.29)
where the elasticity of substitution across foreign intermediate goods is captured by ξf .
Taking all intermediate goods prices P ft (j) as given, profit maximization implies a demand
schedule for each intermediate good, as well as an overall price index for the foreign
composite good given by
Y ft (j) = Y
f
t
(
P ft (j)
P ft
)−ξf
, (2.30)
P ft =
(∫ 1
0
P ft (j)
1−ξf
dj
) 1
1−ξf
. (2.31)
2.4 Intermediate Good Production
2.4.1 Domestic Intermediate Good Production
Domestic intermediate goods are produced by monopolistically competitive firms facing
nominal rigidities à la Calvo (1983). The domestic intermediate good producer of the
type j good combines capital stock Kt(j) with labour Lt(j) to produce the differentiated
intermediate good Yt(j) using the production function:7
Yt(j) =
 AZt Kt(j)θkLt(j)θh −Θ if AZt Kt(j)θkLt(j)θh ≥ Θ0 otherwise , (2.32)
7The general functional form of the production technology is AZt Kt(j)θkLt(j)θhHet (j)
θeHbt (j)
θb − Θ,
where Het (j) and Hbt (j) denotes respectively entrepreneurs and bankers labour supply. However, we omit
Het (j) and Hbt (j) because of their very small quantitative contribution in the production mechanism.
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where the non-negative parameter Θ represents the fixed costs of production and is cal-
ibrated to guarantee that economic profits are zero in steady-state (see Christiano et al.
(2005)). Further, AZt is a technology shock that follows the stochastic process given by
log(AZt ) = (1− ρa) log(AZ) + ρalog(AZt−1) + AZt. (2.33)
The total cost function TCt(j) is defined as
TCt(j) = r
k
tKt(j) +W
h
t Lt(j), (2.34)
and minimizing cots of producing a given level of output follows
min
Kt(j),Lt(j)
{
TCt = r
k
tKt(j) +WtLt(j)
}
s.t. Yt(j) = A
Z
t Kt(j)
θkLt(j)
1−θk −Θ,
(2.35)
where rkt denotes the rental rate on capital services and Wt is the price of the composite
labour input. Let mct be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the problem (2.35)
which can be interpreted as the real marginal cost of producing one unit additional of
output. The first-order conditions are given by
rkt = mctA
Z
t θkA
Z
t Kt(j)
θk−1Lt(j)1−θk ,
Wt = mctA
Z
t (1− θk)AZt Kt(j)θkLt(j)−θk .
(2.36)
Production is allocated to two uses: a part of this intermediate good is used in producing
the composite domestic good (see (2.25)), and the remaining part Y xt (j) is exported: we
then have
Yt(j) = Y
d
t (j) + Y
x
t (j). (2.37)
Price-setting is organized as follows. Assume that in each period, a fraction 1 − φd of
domestic firms can reoptimize their prices. When allowed to do so, a firm chooses a price
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P˜ dt (j), in order to maximize its discounted real profits. All other firms can only index
their prices to past inflation, with the degree of indexation controlled by a parameter
χd ∈ [0, 1].8 An intermediate good producer j allowed to reoptimize at time t realizes
that the chosen price P˜ dt (j) at time t, will, after l periods with no reoptimizing, be
P dt+l(j) = (pi
d
t+1)
χd × (pidt+2)χd × · · · × (pidt+l−1)χd × P dt (j) =
l−1∏
s=1
(pidt+s)
χdP dt (j), (2.38)
where pidt+l = P dt+l/P dt+l−1. The maximization problem of this reoptimizing firm j is then:
max
P˜ dt (j)
Et
∞∑
l=0
(βφd)
lΛt+l
{(
l−1∏
s=1
(pidt+s)
χd
P˜ dt (j)
P dt+l
−mct+l
)
Yt+l(j)
}
s.c. Yt+l(j) =
(
l−1∏
s=1
(pidt+s)
χd
P˜ dt (j)
P dt+l
)−ξd,t
Yt+l,
(2.39)
where Λt+l is the marginal utility of wealth for firm j in period t + l. Denote
p˜dt = P˜
d
t (j)/Pt and assume all reoptimizing firms adopt the same strategy; the first order
conditions related to p˜dt (j) lead to:
p˜dt =
ξd,t
ξd,t − 1
Et
∞∑
l=0
(βφd)
lΛt+lmct+l
(
l−1∏
s=1
(pidt+s)
χd
pidt+s+1
)−ξd,t
Yt+l(j)
Et
∞∑
l=0
(βφd)
lΛt+l
(
l−1∏
s=1
(pidt+s)
χd
pidt+s+1
)1−ξd,t
Yt+l(j)
. (2.40)
Domestic composite output, Yt, is divided into domestic use, Y dt , and exports, Y xt . The
good bundle prepare for exports is aggregated by competitive firms using the functional
form
Y xt =
(∫ 1
0
Y xt (j)
ξyx−1
ξyx dj
) ξyx
ξyx−1
, (2.41)
where the elasticity of substitution between intermediate-good types is denoted by ξyx. In
8χd = 0 refers to a non-indexation case whilst χd = 1 denotes a perfect indexation case.
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this framework, domestic producers are not able to price discriminate between the part
of their production that will be used for domestic production and what will be exported.9
In this context, profit maximization by exports assemblers leads to the following (for-
eign) demand for good j
Y xt (j) =
(
P dt (j)
P dt
)−ξyx
Y xt . (2.42)
We assume that overall foreign demand for domestic goods is proportional to foreign GDP.
Following Ambler et al. (2004), this implies that foreign demand Y xt is
Y xt =
(
P dt
etP ∗t
)−τ
Y ∗t = s
τ
t Y
x
t where st =
(
etP
∗
t
P dt
)
. (2.43)
In this expression, the parameter τ (τ > 0) describes the elasticity of demand for domestic
good and st denotes the real exchange rate. The foreign price, P ∗t , is an exogenous process
and foreign GDP, Y ∗t , is assumed to follow a mean reverting stochastic process given by:
log(Y ∗t ) = (1− ρy∗) log(Y ∗) + ρy∗log(Y ∗t−1) + y
∗
t ,
where Y ∗ is steady-state foreign production and y
∗
t is a zero-mean, serially uncorrelated
shock.
2.4.2 Foreign Intermediate Good Production
Recall that the domestic economy imports foreign intermediate goods. These interme-
diates are imported and resold by a continuum of firms indexed by j ∈ (0, 1). Again,
these firms operate under monopolistic competition and the imported intermediates are
then assembled into the composite imported good, Y ft (see (2.29)). Price setting is again
assumed to follow a nominal rigidity à la Calvo.10 Each period, a fraction 1− φf of firms
9This corresponds to the so called "producer pricing" paradigm.
10Note that introducing Calvo-type staggered price setting in the imported goods market allows the
model to capture incomplete exchange rate pass-through in import prices.
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can reoptimize its price. When allowed to do so, a firm chooses the price to solve the
following program:
max
P˜ ft (j)
Et
∞∑
l=0
(βφf )
lΛt+l
Ωft+l
P dt+l
,
with
Ωft+l =
(
P˜ ft (j)− et+lP ∗t+l
)( P˜ ft (j)
P ft+l
)−ξf
Y ft+l.
The first oder conditions lead to:
P˜ ft (j) =
ξf
1− ξf
Et
∞∑
l=0
(βφf )
kΛt+kY
f
t+k(j)st+l
Et
∞∑
l=0
(βφf )
kΛt+kY
f
t+k(j)/P
d
t+k
, (2.44)
where ξf represents the elasticity of substitution between differentiated imported goods.
2.5 Monetary Authorities and Government
Monetary policy is conducted by the home central bank, which manages the nominal
interest rate Rdt = (1 + rdt ), in response to fluctuations in domestic GDP and in consumer
price inflation using a Taylor-type rule. Specifically, assume the following functional form:
log
(
Rdt /R
d
)
= λr log
(
Rdt−1/R
d
)
+ (1− λr)
(
λpilog (pit/pi) + λy log
(
Yt/Y
))
+ ρµ log (ϑt) ,
(2.45)
with λr ∈ (0, 1) and where the variables pi and Y represent the target level of inflation
and the target level of output, respectively.11 The term ϑt denotes a monetary policy
shock that follows the first-order autoregressive process
log(ϑt) = ρmp log(ϑt−1) + 
dmp
t , (2.46)
11The use of the previous period interest rate allow us to match the smooth profile of the observed
interest rate in the data.
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with dmpt ∼ N (0, 1).
There are two foreign monetary policy variables, the interest rate on foreign bonds,
Rft , and foreign inflation pi∗t .12 We use the following stochastic process to capture their
dynamics:
log(Rft ) = (1− ρRf ) log(Rf ) + ρRf log(Rft−1) + fmpt , (2.47)
where ρRf ∈ (0, 1) denotes the persistence of the foreign monetary policy shock. The
stochastic process for the evolution of the foreign price is likewise given by
log(pi∗t ) = (1− ρpif )log(pi∗) + ρpif log(pi∗t−1) + pi
∗
t . (2.48)
Turning to fiscal policy, the domestic governments budget constraint is given by
Gt + (1 + r
b
t )
Bdt−1
pit
+
Mt−1
Pt
+Xt = B
d
t + τwWtHt +
Mt
Pt
, (2.49)
where the right hand represents government income: new debt issued, Bdt , tax revenue
paid by households, τwWtHt, and money creation, Mt −Mt−1. The left side describes
uses of government revenue: government spending, Gt, money transfers Xt and debt
repayments, (1 + rbt )Bdt−1. Government spending is exogenous and follows the stochastic
process
log(Gt) = (1− ρg) log(G) + ρg log(Gt−1) + gt , (2.50)
where G denotes the steady-state value of government spending.
3 Aggregation and Competitive Equilibrium
Aggregate investment I˜t is defined as a sum of all individual investment projects in the
economy and is given by
12Recall an assumption of a small open economy, which explains why the foreign monetary variables
are exogenously determined.
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I˜t =
∫
It(j)dj =
∫
(at(j) + nt(j))
Gt
dj =
A˜t + N˜t
Gt
, (3.1)
where 1/Gt denotes bank leverage (common to all individual projects) and A˜t and N˜t
denote the aggregate levels of bank capital and entrepreneur net worth, respectively.
The capital stock held by each group of agents is K˜ht for households, K˜bt for bankers
and K˜et for entrepreneurs. Aggregation requires that
K˜ht = η
hKht , K˜
b
t = η
bKbt , K˜
e
t = η
eKet , (3.2)
where ηh, ηb and ηe represent the population masses of households, bankers and en-
trepreneurs, respectively. Considering the financial contract structure, the dynamic evo-
lution of bank capital, At, and entrepreneur’s net worth, Nt, are governed by
A˜t = (r
k
t +Qt(1− δ))K˜bt + ηbW bt and N˜t = (rkt +Qt(1− δ))K˜et + ηeW et . (3.3)
As bankers and entrepreneurs are both assumed to be risk-neutral agents, capital accu-
mulation at the beginning of the period t+ 1 can be written as13
K˜bt+1 = τ
bαgRbt I˜t and K˜
e
t+1 = τ
eαgRet I˜t, (3.4)
with τ b and τ e, the survival probability of bankers and entrepreneurs. These equation
describes the inter-period evolution of bank total assets and entrepreneur net worth.
With probability 1 − τ b, bankers exit the economy and become households. Similarly,
entrepreneurs exit the economy with a probability 1− τ e to become households. This cir-
cular relationship between workers, entrepreneurs and bankers allows us to keep the total
population to 1. Exiting banks and entrepreneurs consume the value of their available
13Successful entrepreneurs and banks survive to the next period with probability τe and τ b, respectively.
These agents save all their wealth, because of risk-neutral preferences and the high return on internal
funds.
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wealth. This implies the following for aggregate consumption of entrepreneurs, bankers
and workers:
C˜bt+1 = (1− τ b)αgRbt I˜t, C˜et+1 = (1− τ e)αgRet I˜t and C˜ht = ηhCht . (3.5)
C˜t = C˜
h
t + C˜
e
t + C˜
b
t ; (3.6)
Definition 3 (Competitive equilibrium) A competitive equilibrium is defined as
a set of functions for (i) households’ policies Cht (i), Iht (i) and Kht (i) that solve the maxi-
mization problem of the household; (ii) firms’ policies Kt(j), Lt(j) and Wt(i) that solves
firms maximization problem; (iii) optimal financial contract Iht , Ret , Rbt , Rht , At, Dt and
Nt; (iv) aggregate prices P dt , P
f
t and Pt and (v) saving and consumption decision rules
for bankers and entrepreneurs.
Equilibrium in the goods markets requires that production be equal to aggregate
demand:
Z = C˜t +QtI˜t +Gt + µQtI˜t; (3.7)
The remain market-clearing conditions are given by:
K˜t = vtK˜
h
t + K˜
e
t + K˜
b
t ; (3.8)
Lt =
∫ ηh
0
Lt(i)di; (3.9)
Het =
∫ ηe
0
Het (j)dj; (3.10)
Hbt =
∫ ηb
0
Hbt (j)dj; (3.11)
Equation (3.8) defines the total capital stock as the holdings of households, en-
trepreneurs and banks. The government faces a No-Ponzi constraint that requires the
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value of foreign debt to equal trade balance. This constraint is given by
Bft + κt(1 + r
f
t )
Bft−1
pi∗t
=
Y xt
st
− Y ft . (3.12)
4 Model Calibration
To evaluate the relative contributions of the bank capital, exchange rate and interest rate
channels in the propagation of shocks, we set the parameters of our model to reflect the
key features of a small open economy like Canada. The parameter values are generally
consistent to those used in the financial frictions literature as in Christiano et al. (2010),
Dib (2010) and Meh and Moran (2010). In the representative household’s utility function,
the weight on leisure ψ is set to 9.05, which leads the steady-state value of household work
effort to be 30% of available time. Following results in Christiano et al. (2010) and Meh
and Moran (2010), the parameter governing habit formation, γ, is fixed to 0.65. The
value of ζ is set in order to match the steady-state of the model for the average ratio M2
in Canada, which is about 128.8% in 2013.14
The household’s discount factor, β, is set to 0.99, implying a long-run real interest rate
of 4% in an annual basis. The share of capital in the production function for intermediate
goods, θk, is set to 0.36 and the depreciation rate of capital is 0.025. As we want to reserve
a small role in production for the work effort of bankers and entrepreneurs, we set the share
of the labour input of the households, θh, to 0.6399. Then we choose θb = θe = 0.00005,
reflecting an equal contribution of bankers and entrepreneurs in the production of inter-
mediate goods and allowing entrepreneurs and bankers to always have non-zero net worth.
The capital utilization parameters are set as follows: we impose that u = 1 and
v(1) = 0 in the steady state, which ensures that the steady state is independent of v(.).
14Data are from annually monetary and financial statistics published by the OECD.
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Next, we set σu = v′′(u)(u)/v′(u) = 0.01 for u = 1 as in Meh and Moran (2010). The
parameter capturing the fixed costs in the production function, Θ, is set to ensure that
the steady state value of profits equals zero. The persistence of the technology shock, ρa,
is set to 0.95 and its standard deviation is 0.0015, which ensure that the model’s simulated
output volatility equal that of observed aggregate data.
The price rigidity parameter, as well as its wage-setting counterpart, are set following
Calvo’s model of staggered price and wage adjustment. As in Christiano et al. (2005),
the probability of not reoptimizing for price and wage setters in the domestic country, φd
and φw, are fixed to 0.75 and 0.64, respectively. The elasticity of substitution between do-
mestic intermediate goods, ξd, and the elasticity of substitution between domestic labour
types, ξw, are set to 8 and 21, respectively. These values are estimated in Christiano
et al. (2010) for the U.S. economy and are commonly used in the literature. In turn,
the probability of not reoptimizing for foreign price setters, φf , is set to 0.5, while the
elasticity of substitution between foreign intermediate goods production, ξf , is calibrated
to 8. The elasticity of substitution between domestic composite good and imported good
λz is set to 0.59.
The domestic monetary policy parameters λr, λpi et λy are set to 0.8, 1.5 and 0.1/4,
respectively. These values satisfy the Taylor principle and are consistent with those es-
timated in Clarida et al. (2000). The standard deviation of both domestic and foreign
monetary policy shocks is fixed to 0.0016, ρmp = ρRf = 0.0016, which ensures that a one-
standard deviation shock moves the interest rate by 0.6 percentage points. This value is
consistent with the empirical estimates reported in Christiano et al. (2005).
In the financial market, the parameters related to capital production and the opti-
mal financial contract between bankers and entrepreneurs are set following Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999), and Meh and Moran (2010). Accordingly, the
steady state value of the bank’s capital asset ratio and the monitoring cost are respec-
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tively set to 14% and 0.025. We set the probability of default in the loan contract in the
event that action ah is undertaken to 1%. As a result, the quarterly probability of success
is 99%, consistent with the results in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). The gap between the
probability of success of the socially preferable action, ah, and the free riders action, al,
is set to 24%, consistent with the results in Meh and Moran (2010). The remaining pa-
rameters and steady-state ratios of the model are set in order to ensure that our model’s
steady state match standard New-Keynesian calibrations: household’s consumption to
GDP ratio is equal to 76%, investment to GDP ratio and Capital to GDP ratio equal
to 0.2 and 12, and domestic good to final good ratio and imported good to final ratio
equal to 70% and 30%. The persistence and the standard deviation parameters of all
remaining shocks are set to 0.95 and 0.01, respectively. Table (1) and Table (2) report
the calibration and the steady-state values of some key variables.
5 Findings
To assess the relative contribution of the bank capital channel in an international frame-
work, we focus on the impulse response functions of some key variables following a variety
of structural shocks. Throughout, we simulate and compare three versions of the model:
model (1) describes the small-open economy model with the active bank capital channel
and nominal rigidities; model (2) is a closed economy with an active bank capital channel,
and is thus similar to Meh and Moran (2010); and finally, model (3) is a variant of the
first model in which an exogenous capital endowment is given to all bankers. This econ-
omy is used to study a situation where banks are well-capitalized, to analyze the role of
bank capital in the propagation of shocks. Specially, our third model provides a surplus
of capital, eb, to surviving and newborns banks. The value of eb is set to ensure that the
banker’s asset-capital ratio in model (3) is 20% higher than in the steady-state for the
baseline model. The only two equations that need to be modified to implement this "
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Table 1: Parameter Calibration
Parameters Description Values
β Discount factor 0.99
Preferences γ Habit formation 0.65
ψ Weight of leisure in utility 9.05
ζ Elasticity of money demand 0.00183
θk Capital share 0.36
Technologies θh Workers labor share 0.6399
and final good θe Entrepreneur labor share 0.00005
production θb Bankers labor share 0.00005
ωd Share of domestic good in final good 0.7
λz Elasticity of domestic good 0.59
δ Depreciation rate of capital 0.02
τw Labor income tax rate 0.2
ρz Autocorrelation of home technology shock 0.95
σz Standard deviation of home technology shock 0.0015
αh High probability of success 0.99
Financial αl Low probability of success 0.75
sector b Private benefit 0.16
µ Monitoring cost 0.025
τe Entrepreneur’s death probability 0.78
τb Banker’s death probability 0.72
ξw Elasticity of labor supply 21
Nominal ξd Elasticity of substitution for domestic goods 8
rigidities ξf Elasticity of substitution for foreign goods 8
φw Wage reoptimization probability 0.64
φd Domestic price reoptimization probability 0.75
φf Foreign price reoptimization probability 0.5
χw Degree of wage indexation 0.1
χh Degree of price indexation 0.1
λr Taylor rule: Interest smoothing 0.8
Monetary λpi Taylor rule: inflation coefficient 1.5
policy λy Taylor rule: GDP coefficient 0.025
ρmp Autocorrelation of home monetary policy shock 0.95
ρRf Autocorrelation of foreign monetary policy shock 0.95
ρpif Autocorrelation of foreign inflation shock 0.95
σmp Standard deviation of home monetary policy shock 0.01
σRf Standard deviation of foreign monetary policy shock 0.01
σpif Standard deviation of inflation shock 0.01
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Table 2: Steady-state values and ratios
Parameters Description Values
Steady-state values
pi Inflation 1.021/4
R Gross real interest rate of investment projects 1.2118
R
b Gross real interest rate of domestic bonds 1.015
Rd Gross real interest rate of deposits 1.0101
1/G Bank leverage 1.75
Steady-state ratios
C˜h/Y Household consumption to GDP ratio 76%
C˜b/Y Banker consumption to GDP ratio 0.57%
C˜e/Y Entrepreneur consumption to GDP ratio 2.76%
I˜/Y Investment to GDP ratio 20%
K˜/Y Capital to GDP ratio 12
Y d/Z Domestic good to final good ratio 70%
Y f/Z Imported good to final good ratio 30%
well-capitalized" economy are
A˜t = (r
k
t +Qt(1− δ))K˜bt + ηbW bt + ηbeb, (5.1)
Z + ηbeb = C˜t +QtI˜t +Gt + µQtI˜t. (5.2)
Figure 4 displays the impulse responses of key domestic aggregates following a negative
shock to bank capital. Next, Figures 5 and 6 depict impulse responses following a negative
technology shock, while Figures 7 and 8 display responses following a domestic monetary
policy shock. Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the relative contribution of the bank capital
in the transmission of international shocks by comparing our baseline model (model (1))
to model (3). Finally, Figures 11, 12 and 13 display the impulse responses following a
domestic technology shock, a domestic monetary policy and a government spendings shock
while assessing the role of the bank capital in the mechanism of international transmission
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of domestic shocks.15
5.1 Bank Capital Channel and bank capital shocks
Empirical evidence suggests that bank capital, in addition to entrepreneurial net worth,
has important impacts on the propagation of shocks. The purpose of this subsection is
to investigate the relative contribution of this bank capital channel and in this context,
Figure 4 displays the impulse responses following a negative shock to bank capital in
model (1) and model (2). This shock may be interpreted as a ‘credit crunch’ caused by a
sudden deterioration in banks’ balance sheet that leads to decline in the net worth of bank
(bank capital). To implement this sudden deterioration in bank net worth, we assume
that bank capital is subject to episodes of accelerated depreciation, as in
A˜t = (r
k
t +Qt(1− δϑδt ))K˜bt + ηbW bt , (5.3)
where ϑδt is characterized by an AR(1) process given by
log(ϑδt ) = ρδlog(ϑ
δ
t−1) + 
δ
t . (5.4)
With (5.3), a positive value of ϑδt leads to an unexpected decrease in the value of bank
capital, consistent with the experience during the recent financial crisis. Owing to the
financial frictions present in the model, such a decrease in bank capital leads to credit
rationing and a decrease in bank lending. The downward effect is much more important
in model (2) (3.5%) (the closed economy) than in the baseline model (2.5%) (the open
economy).16 In addition, aggregate investment declines by 2% in the baseline model and
by 3% in the closed economy. The exchange rate appreciates and imports react positively
while exports decline, but less than the increasing imports. Output and investment de-
15Each variable’s response is expressed as the percentage deviation from its steady-state level.
16A sudden scarcity in the lending market drives down entrepreneur’s net worth by around 10%, which
moves up the external financial premium and domestic prices.
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crease by more in the closed economy than in the baseline open-economy model.17 Apart
from consumption, following a negative bank capital shock, key economic aggregates react
negatively and a part of this negative effect is transferred to the foreign economy through
the exchange rate channel. The results points out the dampening role of the exchange
rate channel in the propagation mechanism.
5.2 International Transmission of Shocks
5.2.1 Negative Technology Shock
Figures 5 and 6 display responses for the open-economy model (model 1) and for its closed-
economy counterpart (model 2) following a 1% negative technology shock. Model (1) and
model (2) display some common characteristics. Indeed, with a negative technology shock,
the realized capital return is less than expected, which generates a negative effect on firms’
net worth and forces an increase in the leverage ratio, exacerbating agency costs in the
financial contract. As a consequence, the external finance premium increases and creates a
negative effect on the credit demand side. On the other hand, a negative technology shock
generates unexpected loss on the loan portfolio and weakens banks’ capital positions. The
deterioration in bank’s balance sheets produces a negative signal to households about the
financial health of banks. As a consequence, households are less willing to place deposits
with banks. This increases the banks’ external cost of funding and creates a negative
impact on the credit supply side. Given these two negative effects, aggregate lending
declines, which pushes down investment and output.
Although model (1) and model (2) display common characteristics, responses for the
small open economy are more amplified than responses for the closed economy, especially
for aggregate output and consumption, and effects are smaller in the closed economy
model. Domestic prices are driven up, which makes domestic good more costly than
17Output drives down by more than 0.4% in the model (2) and by 0.2 in the baseline model. Aikman
and Paustian (2006) shown that a 10% decreasing in bank’s capital asset ratio leads to a 0.6% decreasing
in output.
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foreign goods. Immediately after the shock, the exchange rate depreciates suddenly but
appreciates back and persistently a few periods later. The appreciation of the exchange
rate leads to a rise in imports and a decrease in exports. With a negative technology
shock, our model highlights both wealth and substitution effects. Substitution effects
which is a consequence of the appreciation of the exchange rate, include the increases
in imports. Wealth effects lead to a reduction of household’s consumption in short run.
All things considered, aggregate output, investment and consumption decrease sharply
following the shock with the exchange rate channel playing an important amplification
role in propagating the effects of the initial shock.
Expansionary Monetary Policy (decrease in interest rates)
Figures 7 and 8, which display impulse responses following a 1% domestic monetary
policy easing, illustrates that monetary policy has direct effects on aggregate spending and
output, that operate through the interest rate and exchange rate channels. A decrease in
the domestic interest rate drives down the cost of deposits, and the supply of bank credit
as well as increases. Household consumption, as well as bankers’ and entrepreneurs’
consumption, aggregate investment, move up. The exchange rate depreciates which helps
create an increase in exports and a decrease in imports.
5.3 Transmission of International Shocks
The contagion phenomena that accompanied the recent financial crisis has made it more
important than ever to understand the transmission of international shocks. This section
illustrates the contribution of the banking sector, especially the role of bank capital, in
the transmission of international shocks. For this task, we focus on the impact of a foreign
monetary policy and a foreign demand shocks in model (1) and model (3). As indicated
before, model (3) is a small open economy with additional sources of bank capital. Figures
9 and 10 display impulse responses functions for a tightening foreign monetary policy and
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a negative foreign demand shocks, respectively.
5.3.1 Foreign Demand Shock
Figure 9 depicts impulse responses following a negative foreign demand shock (a shock
to foreign output). This shock leads to a decrease in exports of 1%, a decrease in output
of 0.8% and a decrease in household consumption of 0.15%. The decrease in domestic
output produces a negative output gap and a rise in the prices, which creates an infla-
tionary pressure. As result, the home central bank reacts by tightening monetary policy,
which leads to higher interest rate and a higher cost of deposits. The supply of bank
credit declines and the return from lending goes up, which deteriorates the balance sheets
of banks. As a consequence, banks’ net worth falls and so does the net worth of the
entrepreneurs, which produces a rise of the leverage ratio. Overall, the foreign demand
shock has a negative impact on aggregate lending and drives investment down by 4%.
Higher prices and interest rates are followed by an appreciation of the real exchange rate,
which leads to a decrease in imports by substituting foreign factors by domestic factors
of production. In absolute value, exports decrease by more than imports following the
negative foreign demand shock, leading to a negative impact on the current account. The
negative impact of the foreign demand shock is smaller in the model with more bank
capital than in the baseline model, and the return to equilibrium is also faster than in the
baseline model. These results highlight the dampening effects of a strong bank capital
buffers and are consistent with those found in Meh and Moran (2010) and Dib (2010) in
a closed economy.
5.3.2 Foreign Monetary Policy Shock
Figure 10 depicts the impulse responses following a tightening of foreign monetary policy.
Foreign monetary policy affects domestic aggregates through the exchange rate channel.
An increase in the foreign interest rate increases foreign prices, which depreciates the
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domestic real exchange rate in short run. As a consequence, imports decrease and exports
increase, which positively affects the current account. However, the decrease in imports
is much more important than the increase in exports, causing a decrease in domestic
output and investment. In the short term, household wealth increases, which produces
an increase in household’s consumption. As in the case of negative foreign output shock,
return to equilibrium is faster in the model with more bank capital than in the baseline
model. However, effects following to a tightening foreign monetary policy are small than
those of a negative foreign demand shock.
5.4 Sensitivity of the Bank Capital
The aim of this section is to highlight the relative contribution of bank capital in the
dynamic of international shocks transmission. For this purpose, we compare the impulse
responses of model (1) and model (3) following a negative domestic technology shock,
a tightening of domestic monetary policy, and a negative government spending shock.
Figures 11, 12 and 13 display the impulse responses of key domestic aggregates following
to these aforementioned shocks, respectively. Overall, results suggest that bank capital
plays a crucial role in the transmission of shocks as well as in the velocity of return to
equilibrium. These results, which are consistent to those highlighted by Meh and Moran
(2010) and Dib (2010) show that following a negative shock, bank capital plus a dampening
effect. However, following a positive shock, bank capital plays an amplification role in
the dynamic of shocks propagation. An economy with more bank capital has a better
capacity to face against adverse shocks than an economy with less bank capital. This
result, which remains valid for both the transmission of international shocks, highlights
the importance of bank capital.
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6 Concluding Remarks
Recent empirical evidence suggests that the health of banks’ balance sheets plays an
important role in the transmission of monetary policy and other shocks. This paper
presents an international DSGE framework with an active bank capital channel to assess
issues regarding the transmission of domestic and foreign shocks. The starting point of
our model is the microfounded framework developed by Meh and Moran (2010), Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2011) and Dib (2010), to which we include cross-border trade in goods,
the exchange rate channel and a government. We analyze the relative contribution of the
bank balance sheets channel, the exchange rate channel, and the interest rate channel in
the propagation of internal and external shocks.
The results of our simulations may be summarized as follow: (i) In the presence
of the exchange rate channel, the propagation of both domestic and foreign shocks are
amplified when comparing our baseline economy to a closed economy. (ii) Depending of
the level of bank capital in the economy, productivity and monetary policy shocks that
originate domestically have an important quantitative role in explaining domestic output,
investment, bank lending, entrepreneurs and banks net worth, inflation and interest rates.
(iii) External shocks (monetary policy shock and foreign demand shock) also contribute
to domestic aggregate fluctuations. (iv) Economies whose banks remain well-capitalized
when affected by adverse shock experience less severe downturns, i.e., when the bank
capital channel is active, an economy with more bank capital is better able to face adverse
shocks than an economy with less bank capital. This last result, which remains valid for
the transmission of international shocks, highlights the importance of bank capital in an
international framework and can be used to inform the worldwide debate over the banking
regulation.
Future, research could allow the model to take into account the heterogeneity in banks’
capitalization that characterizes banking sectors, by developing a two-country model with
financial frictions and endogenous portfolio choice in both domestic and foreign economy.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Structure of the model
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Figure 2: General structure of the model
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7.2 Good market
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Figure 3: Structure of good distribution
7.3 Proof of the proposition 1
In equilibrium, (2.3) and (2.4) hold with equality; therefore, solving for the shares Ret and
Rbt , and using these results into the sharing condition yields:
Ret =
b
∆α
, Rbt =
µ
Qt∆α
, Rht = R−
b
∆α
− µ
Qt∆α
, (7.1)
where ∆α ≡ αh − αl. Introducing (7.1) into the participation constraints (2.1) and
(2.2), which hold with equality, yields:
At = α
hµIt/(1 + r
a
t )∆α and Dt =
αhQt
(1 + rdt )
(
Rt − b
∆α
− µ
Qt∆α
)
. (7.2)
Finally, solving for It in (7.2) leads to:
It = (Nt + At)/
(
1 + µ− α
hQt
1 + rdt
(
Rt − b
∆α
− µ
Qt∆α
))
= (Nt + At)/Levt, (7.3)
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Figure 4: IRF from a decrease in bank capital
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Notes : This figure presents impulse response functions from the simulated DSGE model to illustrate the
effect of the bank capital channel in the closed economy (CE, model 2), and in our small open economy
(SOE, model 1). Responses are expressed in percentage deviation from steady-state values.
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Figure 5: IRF from a negative technology shock (panel B)
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Notes : This figure presents impulse response functions from the simulated DSGE model to illustrate the
effect of a negative home technology shock, comparing the closed economy (CE, model 2) and our small
open economy (SOE, model 1). Responses are expressed in percentage deviation from the steady-state
values.
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Figure 6: IRF from a negative technology shock (panel B)
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Notes : This figure presents impulse response functions from the simulated DSGE model to illustrate the
effect of a negative home technology shock, comparing the closed economy (CE, model 2) and our small
open economy (SOE, model 1). Responses are expressed in percentage deviation from the steady-state
values.
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Figure 7: IRF from a monetary policy shock (panel A)
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Note : This figure presents impulse response functions from the simulated DSGE model to illustrate
the effect of a home monetary easing, comparing the closed economy (CE, model 2) and our small open
economy (SOE, model 1). Responses are expressed in percentage deviation from the steady-state values.
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Figure 8: IRF from a monetary policy shock (panel B)
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Notes : This figure presents impulse response functions from the simulated DSGE model to illustrate
the effect of a home monetary easing, comparing the closed economy (CE, model 2) and our small open
economy (SOE, model 1). Responses are expressed in percentage deviation from the steady-state values.
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Figure 9: IRF from a negative foreign output shock
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Notes : This figure presents impulse response functions from the simulated DSGE model to illustrate the
effects of bank capital in the transmission of international shock. The shock is a negative foreign output
shock, and the Figure compares our small open economy (SOE, model 1) and the economy with more
bank capital (model 3). Responses are expressed in percentage deviation from the steady-state values.
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Figure 10: IRF from a foreign monetary policy shock
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Notes : This figure presents impulse response functions from the simulated DSGE model to illustrate the
effects of bank capital in the transmission of international shock. The shock is a foreign monetary policy
shock and the Figure compares our small open economy (SOE, model 1) and the economy with more
bank capital (model 3). Responses are expressed in percentage deviation from the steady-state values.
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Figure 11: IRF from a negative technology shock
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Notes : This figure presents impulse response functions from the simulated DSGE model to illustrate
the effects of bank capital in the international transmission of domestic shocks. The case is that of a
negative technology shock in the home country, comparing our small open economy (SOE, model 1) and
the economy with more bank capital (model 3). Responses are expressed in percentage deviation from
the steady-state values.
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Figure 12: IRF from a monetary policy shock
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Notes : This figure presents impulse response functions from the simulated DSGE model to illustrate the
effects of bank capital in the international transmission of domestic shocks. The case is that monetary
policy easing in the home country, comparing our small open economy (SOE, model 1) and the economy
with more bank capital (model 3). Responses are expressed in percentage deviation from the steady-state
values.
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Figure 13: IRF from a a negative government spending shock
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Notes : This figure presents impulse response functions from the simulated DSGE model to illustrate the
effects of bank capital in the international transmission of domestic shocks. The case is that of a negative
government spending shock in the home country, comparing our small open economy (SOE, model 1)
and the economy with more bank capital (model 3). Responses are expressed in percentage deviation
from the steady-state values.
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